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CONCEPTUALISM BY ANY OTHER NAME...
NANCY EHRENREICH"

I. INTRODUCTION
Attitudes towards critical legal thought seem to be changing. When the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies first came on the legal scene in the
1970s, it was the "bad boy" of legal scholarship. Critical legal theory's sharpest critics characterized it as pure critique, as containing no substance of its
own but instead merely delighting in the deconstruction of prevailing modes of
legal analysis. In short, they saw it as not a theory at all; it was pure nihilism.' Failing to see the political assumptions that informed their own work,
these writers viewed critical theory as the exact opposite of scholarship: as
biased and self-interested instead of neutral, advocacy instead of analysis,
political diatribe instead of legal reasoning. In short, many law professors saw
it as a discourse outside the academy, not of it. Nevertheless, I would argue
that at the beginning CLS actually reinforced the legitimacy of mainstream
legal thought,2 providing the foil against which such thought could define
itself, the "other" in a self-other binary? If critical theory was nihilist, biased,

* Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1974, Yale; J.D., 1979,
L.L.M. 1981, University of Virginia. I would like to thank Alan Chen, Catherine Kemp, and Charlie Piot for their comments on earlier drafts, as well as all of the participants in the University of
Denver College of Law Symposium on Coercion for their feedback. Symposium, Coercion: An
InterdisciplinaryExamination of Coercion, Exploitation, and the Law, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 875
(1997). I also appreciate the able research assistance provided by Thomas Cincotta.
1. See, e.g., Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 222, 226-7 (1984).
2. It is always hazardous to generalize about the views of a large and diverse group of
people, such as "mainstream" law professors. Moreover, most law professors are rather
atheoretical (if not antitheoretical) in their orientation. (Many were trained by legal realists and
have taken from that experience a commitment to empiricism and a profound skepticism about
grand theory; others identify with the practicing bar and are dismissive (if not suspicious) of "ivory tower" thinking that seems to have little relevance to the world of practice.) Nevertheless, I
would argue that there are definite similarities among most law professors' ideas of how to "do"
law. Those ideas tend to be composed of an amalgam of jurisprudential influences, including: a
realist-styled emphasis on social science and policy analysis, a process theory focus on institutional roles, an enduring formalist commitment to the basic (even if not complete) objectivity and
determinacy of language, and a liberal belief in the essential neutrality of law (evinced through
distinctions such as process/substance, facts/beliefs, and law/politics, as well as in the use of supposedly apolitical balancing tests). It is this set of characteristics that I envision when I use the
term, "mainstream legal thought."
3. Of course, this is not unusual. Many recent writers have discussed how the dominant
term in any hierarchical relationship needs the other term to define itself. For a particularly trenchant articulation of such an analysis, see EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1994).
At one point Said quotes Sartre: "Mhe European has only been able to become a man through
creating slaves and monsters." Id. at 197 (quoting Jean Paul Sartre, Preface to FRANTZ FANON,
THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 7, 26 (1968)); see also, PATRICIA HiLL CouINs, BLACK FEMINIST
THOUGHT. KNOWLEDGE, CONscIOUsNESS AND THE POLMCS OF EMPowERmENT 68 (1991).
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destructive and totalitarian, then mainstream legal theory must be positive,
neutral, constructive and liberating.4 As long as critical theory was seen as
pure' critique, mainstream theorists could continue to maintain that they, in
contrast, were doing neutral "legal reasoning" (whether they saw the neutrality
as coming from doctrinal or from policy analysis). By viewing CLS as not a
legitimate legal theory at all, they could avoid acknowledging the substantive
assumptions implicit within their own analyses.
Of course, instead of seeing critical legal thought as pure critique, mainstream legal thinkers could have viewed it as presenting an alternative set of
substantive political preferences upon which to found a legal system-as articulating, for instance, a preference for the community over the individual, for
substantive over formalist definitions of justice, for participatory over authoritarian legal structures, for human values over property values, for contextual
over abstract legal rules, and the like. However, to see CLS in this way would
have required mainstream legal thinkers not only to recognize the substantivity
of their own approach, but also to concede that the debate between themselves
and critical scholars was a debate between equally rational, alternative paradigms that were founded upon differing political preferences about the ordering of society. Such an admission would, of course, have fundamentally challenged the assumption that mainstream legal analysis was based on logic, not
substantive political judgments. It was easier, therefore-and indeed useful-to
simply dismiss CLS as irresponsible rowdyism.
But times have changed. At least in terms of institutional presence, CLS is
much more accepted now. Most law schools feel the need to have at least one
self-proclaimed "Crit" on their faculty; many panels at conferences include
one or more among the presenters; the newer textbooks frequently cite to critical authors in the notes and textual material they present;5 jurisprudential
surveys invariably include critical theories in their lists. While such representation is often mere tokenism, it is still undeniable that many have come to see
critical legal thought as a legitimate approach to legal theorizing.
As a result, one would expect a crisis in confidence to be occurring within
mainstream legal scholarship. That is, it would seem that recognition of the
value of critical theory would necessarily bring with it a concomitant crisis of
legitimacy for mainstream thinking. One would expect, in other words, to see
the entire landscape of legal scholarship changing, to see the foundations of
mainstream legal theory shaking, to see new paradigms overtaking the
field-or, perhaps, a disintegrative splintering of scholarship into a plethora of
approaches, as has happened in other academic fields. And, indeed, on the

4. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 1, at 227. I realize that, in drawing a contrast between
CLS and mainstream legal theory here, I am ignoring a plethora of other jurisprudential schools of
thought, from process theory to law and society to feminist theory, queer theory, and critical race
theory. But if one had to reduce all of the various developments in legal theory during the second
half of the 20th century down to two major trends, I would argue that CLS and mainstream legal
theory best capture the contemporary jurisprudential landscape. Most identity-politics-related theories (critical race theory, feminism, etc.) have close affinities with CLS (despite their forceful
disagreements on particular points) and law and economics is arguably just a pseudoscientific take
on the liberal legal constructs that undergird mainstream theorizing.
5. See, e.g., JAMcES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTs PROcEsS (4th ed. 1994).
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margins this splintering is exactly what is happening. Within progressive legal
scholarship there has been a luxurious growth of offshoots: queer theory,
intersectionality, feminism, critical race theory, etc. But all of this has taken
place only on the edges of the academic world, while mainstream legal
thought remains essentially unchanged, sailing on placidly like a huge ship
oblivious to the sharks sniping at its bows.
Now, it is not unimportant that critical theory has become an accepted
mode of legal analysis. No longer the "bad boy" of the academy, today it is
seen as a legitimate choice in the smorgasbord of jurisprudential offerings. For
those who recognize the value of working within the system, this new inside
(if still not insider) status brings a certain satisfaction. From the inside one can
affect hiring, rules structure and policies, institutional publications, and the
like. But there is also something very troubling about being inside, about the
notion that one can choose between CLS and law and economics, or feminism
and utilitarianism, in the same way that one chooses between Crest and
Pepsodent, chocolate and vanilla. Like its predecessor, critical realism, critical
legal theory risks being merely absorbed into liberal legal thinking, its insights
reduced to window-dressing-a set of flat and simplified assertions to which
one pays brief obeisance before continuing on with one's analysis, but which
do not change that analysis in any fundamental way. In the past, mainstream
legal theory (and the larger liberal ideology of which it is a part) reduced the
threat posed by critical knowledges such as CLS by rejecting their contributions as illegitimate obstructionism. Today, it continues to reduce the threat of
CLS, but in a subtler way-by absorbing it through reformist adjustments to
the existing system.6 Moving from outside to inside might thus be merely a
phyrric victory-a move from exclusion to domestication.!
It is from the perspective of these observations that I find it interesting
and elucidating to examine the two articles by Alan Wertheimer in this issue-both of which were presented at the symposium on Choice and Coercion
for which this article was written! Although Professor Wertheimer is a political philosopher, not a legal theorist, I believe that his papers may provide us
with a valuable window into the interaction between theoretical perspectives
within our own discipline, and may indirectly illustrate the domesticating
dynamic with which I am concerned here.

6. Political discourse in the United States is arguably still in the first stage of outright rejection. Thus, this country, in contrast to Europe, lacks an established socialist political presence, still
viewing left political critique as destructive and un-American, rather than as an alternative--and
equally legitimate (even to those who disagree with it)--political perspective. Presumably, inclusion of the left within the world of legitimate activity would have mixed results in the political
arena, just as (I will argue) it has had in law.
7. On the domestication of legal realism, see generally Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1985).
8. Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation and Commercial Surrogacy, 74 DENy. U. L. REV. 1215
(1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy]; Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion
and Exploitation, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 889 (1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Remarks]. Professor
Wertheimer has written extensively on subjects relevant to the symposium topic. See, e.g., ALAN
WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1972); ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOrrATION (1996). However, given the
space limitations of this commentary on his symposium presentations, I will confine myself here
to those presentations and will not discuss his other work.
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When I first began reading Wertheimer's work in preparation for my role
as commentator at this symposium, I attempted, as one always does, to categorize his analysis. What type of theorist was he? How was he approaching the
material? Indeed the papers presented at the symposium, especially the one on
exploitation, seemed to invite such categorization, by explicitly addressing the
issue of methodology. As I understood Wertheimer's description of his own
approach, he meant to eschew conceptualism in favor of something different,
which he termed "moral" or "normative" analysis.' But as the argument proceeded, I became confused, for Wertheimer's "moral" analysis seemed in fact
to be very abstract, categorical, and deductive-in short, it seemed decidedly
conceptual. Thus, I will argue here that Wertheimer's analysis is an example
of a domesticating use of anti-conceptualist theory. While he seems to have
heeded the critique of abstract analytics, he ultimately succumbs to it, presenting an analysis that, because of its anticonceptualist window-dressing, appears
at first reading to be something that it is not.
What this suggests is that it is important in our own field of legal academics to be wary of similar tendencies. In his purported rejection of conceptualism, Wertheimer of course stakes out a position that is consistent with critical
legal theory (and legal realism before it). Yet, like generations of liberal legal
scholars who have claimed to heed antiformalist arguments only to produce
the same old conceptual analyses in new garb,' ° Wertheimer reveals himself
to be (assumedly not intentionally) a wolf in sheep's clothing. As such, his
analysis attests to the resilience of conceptualism (and/or, perhaps, of liberal
ideology), and suggests that recently expressed scholarly receptivity to critical
arguments does not necessarily presage conceptualism's downfall. Thus, while
it may be encouraging to Crits and other progressive legal academics to see
our colleagues apparently listening to what we have to say, it is important that
we not to be so grateful for the open ear that we fail to criticize incomplete or
domesticating uses of our work.
Professor Wertheimer's articles provide a useful context in which to explore this problem of domestication, for, although he is a political philosopher,
he is writing here about a subject near and dear to mainstream legal categories
of thought: coercion." Moreover, he discusses the concepts of exploitation
and coercion in the context of a number of hypothetical situations that are
exactly like the questions law professors love to pose in classroom discussion,
situations involving such things as offers to buy organs from poor people,
exorbitant charges for sea rescues, sales of lifesaving drugs at high prices, etc.

9. As I will discuss further in Part ILA, Wertheimer does not completely reject conceptualism, but rather conceives of it as having a limited, preliminary, definitional role in his analysis. As
I will also discuss further, he clearly does not see the conceptual aspects as controlling the conclusions he reaches. See infra, Part I.A.
10. While legal thinkers often claim to have escaped conceptualism, they continually fall
prey to its appeal. Thus, process theory has been shown to be fundamentally formalist, see Gary
Peller, Neutral Principlesin the 1950s, 21 MICH. J. LEGAL REFORM 561, 617-19 (1988), as has
law and economics. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
11. His focus is actually on distinguishing coercion from a different phenomenon, which he
calls exploitation.
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In addition, as I will discuss in more detail later, the assumptions informing
Professor Wertheimer's analysis of these types of situations are the same
assumptions that underlie most mainstream legal approaches to such questions.
Thus, his articles for this symposium provide fertile ground for an exploration
of the ways in which mainstream legal analysis might domesticate critical
legal theory.
The following discussion focuses on Professor Wertheimer's discussion of
the issue of contract parenthood, or surrogacy.'2 Just as Wertheimer's purpose
in discussing surrogacy is to highlight his analysis of the concepts of coercion
and exploitation, so my purpose here will be to use the contract parenthood
issue as a vehicle for exploring the nature of the underlying analytical approach that Wertheimer takes to his subject matter. Thus, while I will be saying many things about surrogacy contracts, articulating a fully-developed position on the legality or desirability of such arrangements will not be my goal.
My central point is that, while Wertheimer presents his analysis as a "normative" approach that relies only minimally upon conceptual reasoning, he ultimately reproduces the very mode of analysis that characterizes the perspective he is attempting to escape.
II. OVERVIEW OF WERTHEIMER'S ANALYSIS OF SURROGACY

Professor Wertheimer's analysis of surrogacy takes off from his broader
conceptualization of coercion and exploitation. For Wertheimer, coercion relates to problems in the formation of a contract between two parties. In contrast, exploitation refers to problems in the substance of the agreement
reached, such as unfairness in the pricing arrangement (the price paid by the
buyer for a good or service is too high or the compensation received by the
seller is too low 3) or inappropriateness of the subject matter (the subject of
the contract is something that "should not be exchanged for money""'). I will
refer to the first type of exploitation as reflecting the "just price" concern and
the second type as reflecting the "commodification" concern. Whereas
Wertheimer apparently believes that coercive contracts should not be enforced,
he contends that exploitative agreements are acceptable unless they harm the
offeree."5 Thus, what he calls "mutually advantageous exploitation"-contracts that benefit the offeree but nevertheless violate either just

12. 1 prefer the term "contract parenthood," since "surrogacy" implies the illegitimacy of the
biological (or gestational) mother's connection to the child. Nevertheless, since "surrogacy" is so
widely used, I will employ that term as well.
13. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 897. According to Wertheimer, however, this
does not mean that any transaction in which the parties did not gain roughly equally would be
exploitative. He does not explain how some contract prices could be determined to be too low or
high if not by comparing the benefits obtained by both sides. Instead, he renders the exploitation
question irrelevant, by assuming that surrogacy contracts are exploitative and by arguing that, even
if they are, they are still enforceable as long as they benefit both parties. Wertheimer, Commercial
Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1220-21.
14. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 898.
15. "We do not need to be moral rocket scientists to argue that harmful exploitation may be
legitimately prohibited by the state or that coerced agreements are neither morally nor legally
binding." Id. at 897.
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6
price or commodification concerns-should be legal.
Applying this conceptual framework to surrogacy, Wertheimer begins with
the assumption that such contracts are exploitative, and thus turns immediately
to the question of whether they're mutually advantageous. Here he first considers "nonmoral" harm, asking whether the tangible benefits the surrogate
receives from a surrogacy arrangement outweigh the disadvantages of the contract for her. He concludes that, although it is difficult to say definitively
whether the benefits outweigh the costs, 7 even if they don't that problem can
be simply solved by paying the surrogate more money." Discussions of surrogacy often fail to consider that option, Wertheimer continues, because of
fear of the "moral" harm of surrogacy. It is under the category of moral harm
that he addresses the commodification concern.
Rather than considering the impact that the commodification of reproduction might have on the condition of women as a group, Wertheimer confines
his discussion at this point to the impact surrogacy has on the actual women
who agree to be surrogates. 9 Defining the harm qf commodification quite
narrowly, he essentially treats it as a loss of respect-either of one's self or of
others." He then dismisses this concern, expressing doubt as to whether either the surrogate herself or others in society in fact lose respect for her and
concluding that, even if they do, "it is not clear that [such loss of respect]
represents a basis for condemning the practice [of surrogacy] rather than a
basis for condemning society's reaction" to it." Thus, for Wertheimer, surrogacy is probably advantageous to the surrogate, because it causes her neither

16. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1224. Where surrogacy creates
moral harm,
there are reasons... to prefer a political regime that does not regard such wrongness as
a sufficient justification for invoking the coercive powers of the state.
If surrogacy is a case of mutually advantageous and consensual exploitation, then
it certainly does not follow that... we should prohibit A from exploiting B.
Id.
17. Id. at 1217. "In view of our limited factual knowledge and unresolved theoretical controversies over what counts as objective harm, I am inclined to think that we should now remain
agnostic." Id. at 1217-18.
18. Id. at 1218. "If we are operating in the territory of the surrogate's nonmoral interests, I
think it is entirely possible, nay inevitable, that a sufficiently large increase in compensation
would convert a net harm into a net benefit for many women." Id.
19. Wertheimer recognizes that his limited inquiry into whether commodification makes the
contracts exploitative does not end the discussion: "Commodification may better be understood as
a basis for thinking that surrogacy is wrong for reasons unrelated to the interests of the surrogate
and, therefore, unrelated to worries about exploitation of the surrogate." Id. at 1220. But when he
returns to those reasons, they do not prevent him from concluding that surrogacy should be legal.
See infra, text accompanying notes 68-72.
20. For a much richer conceptualization of the harm that commodification of reproductive
functions can produce, see Margaret Radin, Market Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 188081(1987).
To speak of personal attributes as fungible objects-alienable 'goods'-is intuitively
wrong... We feel discomfort or even insult, and we fear degradation or even loss of the
value involved, when bodily integrity is conceived of as a fungible object. Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is threatening to personhood,
because it detaches from the person that which is integral to the person.
Id. at 1880-81.
21. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1219.
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nonmoral nor moral harm.'
According to Wertheimer, such a "mutually advantageous" contract should
be allowed, even if it is unfair to the surrogate. Even "if surrogacy is wrong
and exploitative because it commodifies that which should not be
commodified, it does not follow that surrogacy should be prohibited or that
surrogacy contracts should not be enforceable."23 For Wertheimer, exploita-

22. 1 must admit that the structure of Wertheimer's argument is a bit confusing to me here.
It is unclear which of two alternative arguments he means to be presenting. First, he could be
differentiating between the question of whether a contract is exploitative and the question of
whether it is harmful. Under that approach, his analysis would look like this:
Exploitation

+

Harmfulness

unjust price?
) if yes, contract is exor
) ploitative; if no, it's not
commodification? )

nonmoral harm? ) if yes, it's harmful
or
) exploitation; if no,
moral harm?
) it's mutually
adv exploitation

The problem with this way of setting up the analysis is that the concept of mutually advantageous
exploitation becomes difficult to comprehend. How can an agreement involve either an unjust
price or commodification and yet not be harmful to either party? In some contexts, the answer
seems easy. If you sell me a glass of water in the desert for a million dollars, I'm still better off
than I would be without it, because without it I'd be dead. The contract, while exploitative
($1,000,000 is an unjust price for a glass of water (or is it, if it's in the desert?)), is still mutually
advantageous (being alive is better than being dead). But in other contexts, and specifically in surrogacy, the distinction between exploitation and harmfulness loses its coherence. How do we
know that an unjust price has been paid for surrogacy services? How do we know whether a surrogate is better off being a surrogate than she would have been had that option not been available?
The only way to judge both exploitativeness and harmfulness is to measure the benefits to her
against the costs; the two inquiries collapse into one.
Alternatively, it could be that Wertheimer in fact intended to collapse the two inquiries
together, in which case his analysis would look like this:
Exploitation
nonmoral harm (unjust price)?
or
moral harm (commodification)?

) if yes, then harmful exploitation;
) if no, then mutually advantageous
) exploitation

Under this approach, however, the concept of exploitation loses all of its substantive content. An
arrangement is seen as mutually advantageous exploitation whenever it involves neither moral nor
nonmoral harm. But there is no indication of why, in such circumstances, it should still be considered to constitute exploitation at all. The exploitation label loses all significance, and
Wertheimer's argument reduces to the contention that beneficial contracts should not be prohibited, a rather uncontroversial point. Because I assume that Wertheimer is meaning to say more than
that, I am assuming that the first interpretation is the correct one.
However, an additional comment that Wertheimer makes in his paper suggests that the
second interpretation might actually be what he intends. At one point Wertheimer acknowledges,
and in fact makes light of, the absence of a definition of exploitation in his paper, noting that, if
someone contests his view that a contract can be both exploitative and mutually advantageous,
such agreements can instead be called "cases of mexploitation or shmexploitation or whatever. I
am interested in the moral character of certain sorts of transactions and relationships, whatever we
want to call them." Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 898-99. Thus, he seems to be saying
that he intends for the concept of exploitation to be in some sense extraneous to his analysis.
Under his formulation, then, the fighting issue is apparently whether the agreement is harmful. Yet
Wertheimer treats that question very conceptually, citing little empirical evidence and aiming most
of his discussion at a very abstract, general level. Nor does Wertheimer ultimately explain why it
is necessary to address the notion of exploitation at all if it is in fact irrelevant to his analysis.
23. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1220.
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tion does not justify banning surrogacy so long as the practice is beneficial to
the surrogate. "Mhe surrogate may be exploited even if surrogacy provides a
net benefit to her. On the other hand, if the compensation is (or could be
made) adequate, then we will have to conclude that the surrogate is not (or
would not be) exploited, whatever else we may want to say about surrogacy. '2 4 Apparently, then, just price trumps commodification; if the amount
paid is Ige enough, he arr.angement canot be exploi.tive, regardless of its
commodification effects. Whatever disrespect the surrogate might feel can be
salved with money.
Regardless of whether surrogacy is considered exploitative, Wertheimer
nevertheless believes that "[iut will be easier to justify the prohibition or nonenforcement of surrogacy agreements if they are nonconsensual." He believes absence of consent is not likely to be a problem, however, for "[o]n any
standard account of coercion, surrogacy is simply not coercive."'2 6 The offer
made to a surrogate is a "positive good"' because it confers a benefit on her
and does not propose to make her worse off if she refuses it. Moreover, any
sense of compulsion that she might experience dud to the circumstances in
which she finds herself-such as a need for money or a lack of employment
options-does not render the contract coercive because those conditions are
not produced by the offeror. Relying here on an individualist notion of
citizens' responsibilities of the sort that critical scholars often critique,
Wertheimer asserts that the intended parents have no obligation to correct the
unequal background conditions that might cause 'a surrogate to accept a
"nonrefusable offer"--an offer that anyone in her situation would rationally
choose to accept. In such situations, the surrogate should be allowed to choose
between the two evils with which she is presented.'
Having concluded that most surrogacy contracts are mutually advantageous and therefore should probably not be prohibited even if exploitative,
Wertheimer considers whether, as an alternative to banning these arrangements, the government should instead regulate the amount paid to the surrogate. However, he concludes that is not necessary either, arguing that a potential surrogate is likely to be in a strong negotiating position vis-a-vis the intended parents and that any restrictions that discouraged surrogacy would
unacceptably infringe upon the autonomy of women who desire to be surrogates. Moreover, even if the surrogacy contract itself could be seen as violative of a woman's freedom, "it remains an open question whether the right to
choose not to be positively or truly free is itself a crucial dimension of one's
autonomy."'

24. Id. at 1221.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1222.
27. Id. at 1223.
28. Id. In contrast to situations where background conditions influence the surrogate's decision, if her decision is instead the product of "cognitive error"-a miscalculation as to the effect
that surrogacy will have on her life-Wertheimer is willing to consider her consent involuntary.
Id. For Wertheimer, then, it appears that irrational or unperceptive women might be deserving of
protection, although powerless women are not. He ultimately leaves the question open, however.
29. Id. at 1225 (cites omitted).

1997]

CONCEPTUALISM BY ANY OTHER NAME...

1289

Finally, Wertheimer returns to the question of the impact of contract parenthood arrangements on society as a whole-a "justice" concern which he
dismisses rather quickly. First, Wertheimer reiterates his point that societal, as
opposed to individual, effects of surrogacy have nothing to do with exploitation as he defines it. Second, he asserts that, since prohibition of surrogacy
would burden "the least well-off" women to benefit others, it is hard to
justify?' Finally, citing an absence of empirical evidence to indicate that surrogacy would reinforce existing inequalities, Wertheimer concludes that the
practice should not be prohibited.
I.

A

CRITIQUE OF WERTHEIMER'S ANALYSIS

In his attempt to avoid a conceptualist analysis, Professor Wertheimer
commits the same error as do thbse who domesticate critical legal thought. His
alternative approach reveals a very narrow conception of what is wrong with
the type of thinking that critical realists and Crits have consistently attacked.
Apparently viewing abstract, categorical reasoning as the primary flaw in
conceptualist analyses, he ignores the critical argument that such analyses are
necessarily grounded upon challengeable, but nevertheless invisible, substantive assumptions. Rather than appreciating the more radical implications of the
critical realist attack on formalism, he domesticates that attack, reducing it to
little more than a call to empiricism.
I will limit my comments on Professor Wertheimer's analysis to three
points. First, as stated above, although Wertheimer dismisses conceptualist
analysis, in founding his argument upon an elaborate web of abstractions and
an essentialist view of the individual legal subject, he ultimately reproduces
the metaphysical approach he purports to reject. Second, like his conceptualism, Wertheimer's summary conclusion that negative liberty is the only type
of liberty to consider here reflects a conceptual framework typical of mainstream legal thought and sharply criticized by the Crits. In endorsing an abstract, decontextualized notion of human liberty, Wertheimer uses as formalistic an argument as that found in Lochner v. New York,3' the
anticonceptualists' favorite whipping boy. Yet his anticonceptualist gloss
makes his analysis seem less dated than it really is. Third, Wertheimer's assertion that background conditions are irrelevant to the enforceability of surrogacy agreements ignores the constitutive role of law in creating those background conditions and thus contributing to the individual choices that respond
to them. This argument, too, adds little to traditional mainstream legal takes on
such issues. Throughout, Wertheimer's argument reproduces, rather than escapes, an individualist, conceptual, and formalist approach to questions of
coercion, exploitation, and surrogacy.

30. Id. at 1228.
31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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A. Normative in Name Only
Professor Wertheimer describes his approach to exploitation as a "normative" or "moralized" approach, emphasizing that "[tihe questions as to what
agreements should be treated as invalid and what behaviors should be prohibited will be settled by moral argument informed by empirical investigation
rather than conceptual analysis."32 He continues:
I do not deny that it is possible to produce a morally neutral or empirical account of coercion ....
I do maintain that if we were to
operate with a morally neutral account of coercion, we would have to
go on to ask whether that sort of coercion renders B's agreement
invalid and that we will be unable to answer that question without
introducing substantive moral arguments."

Thus, regardless of whether the moral inquiry is imported at the
definitional level-the determination of "what counts"34 as coercion or
exploitation-or at the justification level-the determination of when
coercion or exploitation is justified-it cannot be avoided.35
In his articles for this Symposium, Wertheimer seems to mean to
limit himself to discussion of the definitional side of the equation,

explaining that such conceptual analysis is not completely useless, but
must be supplemented at some point by moral inquiry. "The concepts
of coercion and exploitation," he argues, "provide important templates
by which we organize many of the moral issues in which we are interested, but they cannot do much more than that."' Thus, at the same
time that Wertheimer rejects conceptual analysis as inadequate, he endorses it as useful. And, at the same time that he labels his own approach as normative, he grounds it upon a definitional, conceptual
bottom. Wertheimer apparently believes that conceptual and normative
approaches can coexist, and sees no contradiction in trying to combine
them as he does." But I will argue here that the definitional side of
32. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 890.
33. Id. at 892.
34. Id. at 890.
35. The two questions that Wertheimer applies to coercion seem to apply to exploitation as
well, and his discussion of surrogacy reflects a similar bifurcation between definitional and justificatory questions, so I am treating his methodological approaches to coercion and exploitation as
the same.
36. Id. at 890.
37. It is unclear to me exactly what Wertheimer means by "normative" analysis or "substantive moral arguments," but it seems likely that he does not mean the same thing that critical legal
scholars mean when they talk about the moral or value-based element in law. The latter mean to
be referring to the irreduciblypolitical nature of legal decisionmaking, to the fact that the manipulability of legal doctrine means that judicial decisions are based not on the rules but on substantive
visions of how society should be structured and substantive assumptions about the nature of existing social relations. Wertheimer probably does not intend to go that far. In any event, what is
important for present purposes is that he clearly intends to be contrasting normative with conceptal; he clearly believes that purely conceptual analysis is inadequate to the task of resolving problems involving human choices. And, like mainstream theorists who make allusions to critical insights in their own work, he seems to believe that conceptualism and anticonceptualism can peace-
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his argument, the importance of which he minimizes, is actually central
to his approach. Like many legal theorists who have tried to respond to
critical critiques of conceptualism, Wertheimer ultimately fails at the
task he sets for himself. Despite his protestations to the contrary, the
analytics ultimately drive the analysis.
1. What Counts as Mutually Advantageous Exploitation is What Counts,
Period
As I described above, how surrogacy is categorized determines
Wertheimer's assessment of how it ought to be treated. Wertheimer
thinks exploitation that produces nonmoral harm to the surrogate
should perhaps be restricted, that morally harmful exploitation is a
harder case, and that mutually advantageous and consensual exploitation should probably not be prohibited at all." Thus, for Wertheimer,
the categorization of a type of exploitation determines its treatment.
Once he has decided that surrogacy constitutes mutually advantageous
exploitation, his position on regulation is a foregone conclusion. Although Wertheimer distinguishes between definitional and justificatory
inquiries, and emphasizes that either one or the other must include
moral analysis, his conceptual approach to defining types of exploitation becomes the tail that wags the dog, leaving no room for a moralized account.
In setting out his overall approach to analyzing coercion and exploitation, Wertheimer clearly sees the definitional inquiry as separate
from and unrelated to the justificatory questions.39 He thinks it is possible to decide how to defime concepts such as coercion and exploitation without considering the results of those definitions. He treats the
definitional and justificatory questions separately and notes that the
former "are much less important than they first seem," because they
do not tell us whether to prohibit or allow certain agreements. Moreover, Wertheimer believes as well that it is possible to proceed from
the definitional questions to a moral analysis of how a practice ought to
be treated, without having the previously-engaged-in definitional analysis determine one's moral results.
Yet, by separating the definitional from the justificatory questions

fully coexist.

38. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1223.
39. As noted earlier, he states:
The concepts of coercion and exploitation provide important templates by which we
organize many of the moral issues in which we are interested, but they cannot do much
more than that. The questions as to what agreements should be treated as invalid and
what behaviors should be prohibited will be settled by moral argument informed by
empirical investigation rather than by conceptual analysis.
Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 890.
40. Id.
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in this way, Wertheimer has painted himself into a box. If the question
of whether a particular agreement ought to be seen as coercive or exploitative really has no practical ramifications-if it cannot tell us
whether the agreement ought to be regulated or banned-then it is hard
to see why one should care what the agreement is called. We could call
it "coercive," "exploitative," "mutually advantageous," "meditative," or
"car wax," and it would make no difference whatsoever to any conclusions we might draw about its legitimacy. If the definitional inquiry is
not tied to justificatory questions it is pure metaphysics (fine for a
philosopher, perhaps, but rather unsatisfying for a lawyer)."'
On the other hand, if we attempt to tie the definitional question
to the justificatory one-as Wertheimer does in basing the treatment of
a contract on its categorization-then we face a different problem. That
is, it is impossible to decide what counts as coercion or exploitation (or
mutual advantage) without knowing how coercive or exploitative (or
mutually advantageous) agreements will be treated. The definition of a
concept necessarily turns on the purpose for which we are defining it.
To draw on the well-known realist example of this point:42 The defimition of what constitutes a vehicle under an ordinance prohibiting vehicles in the park will depend upon whether the ordinance is designed to
prevent noise pollution (a war monument with a truck on it will be
OK), assure pedestrian safety (golf carts might be OK), or reduce air
pollution (electric cars will be OK). In other words, Wertheimer has set
up a false dichotomy between definitions and impacts. That is, it is
arguably impossible to define coercion without reference to what one is
attempting to accomplish with the concept. Similarly, it is arguably
impossible to decide when a coercive practice should be prohibited
without knowing what exactly we mean by coercive. Thus, once
Wertheimer tells us that, under his scheme, mutually advantageous
exploitation will probably not be prohibited, the response to the question of whether surrogacy constitutes mutually advantageous exploitation resolves as well the question of whether surrogacy should be prohibited. They are two ways of asking the same thing. The conceptual
analysis that (in Wertheimer's terms) does no more than organize the
issues in fact resolves them, leaving no room for moral argument. The
question of what counts as mutually advantageous exploitation is what

41. This may, of course, be a problem of paradigm differences. See generally Catherine
Kemp, The Uses of Abstraction: Remarks on Interdisciplinary Efforts in Law and Philosophy, 74
DENY. U. L. REV. 877 (1997). Professor Wertheimer is a political philosopher, I am an attorney.
Political philosophy invites the exploration of knotty metaphysical problems for the edification
that such exploration provides; law requires concrete answers. I would suggest instead, however,
that there is a flaw in Wertheimer's argument. If exploitation is irrelevant to his analysis, then it
should have been excluded.
42. See Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 630, 633 (1958).
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counts, period.
2. Conceptualism and Consent
In addressing the voluntariness of surrogacy agreements, Professor
Wertheimer again raises both a definition question and a justification
question, and again fails in his effort to keep the two separate. He emphasizes that the label "coercive" means nothing, but he simultaneously
sets up his analysis so that it means everything.
Wertheimer states that our labeling of a surrogate's contract as
consented or coerced will not resolve the substantive moral question of
whether it ought to be prohibited. "Whatever label we use to describe
her choice, we must still decide whether she should be allowed to
make such a choice. And referring to such choices as 'coerced' will not
resolve that substantive moral question."'43 Here Wertheimer sounds
very much as if he believes that terms like rights, duress, and coercion
should not be understood metaphysically and that conceptual reasoning
relying upon such terms cannot be the basis for judicial conclusions-points that critical scholars frequently make as well. But he
nevertheless ultimately resorts to an approach to coercion that is just as
formalistic as his approach to exploitation, ignoring his earlier indictment of the question-begging nature of such analyses.
Consent is important in two places in Wertheimer's surrogacy
article. First, he notes that, while consensual exploitation is possible, it
is nevertheless easier to justify prohibiting surrogacy contracts if they
are nonconsensual-that is, involuntary. ' Second, he states that, even
if a surrogacy contract could be said to have violated the woman's
rights (for example, her right not to have her reproductive labor
commodified), her consent eliminates any concern we should have for
such a violation. To Wertheimer, the answer to the question, "Was the
surrogate's consent coerced?," directly affects how the contract should
be treated.
Despite having expressed skepticism about the validity of the enterprise, Wertheimer does not hesitate to label surrogacy voluntary: "On
any standard account of coercion, surrogacy is simply not coercive."45
This is because coercing someone means threatening to make her worse
off if she does not accept one's offer. Since the intended parents do not
propose to make the surrogate worse off were she to refuse their offer
to pay her for bearing them a child, their offer is not coercive. Moreover, any situational factors that might make the offer

43. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1223.
44. Id. at 1221. Wertheimer also asserts, more definitively, that coerced agreements should
not be legally binding.
45. Id. at 1222.

1294

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4

"nonrefusable"-difficult to pass up---are irrelevant, because they are
not caused by the intended parents. In such situations, "it is arguable
that it is the background conditions that are the problem and not the
offer that allows [the surrogate] to improve on those background conditions. The offer is still a positive good."' Even if the surrogate has
been forced by circumstances to agree to sell her reproductive capacity,
she has not been "coerced" because the parties with whom she has
contracted are not responsible for those circumstances. Thus,
Wertheimer concludes, "the intended parents' proposal is an offer, and
offers do not coerce."47
Just as Wertheimer's attempt to combine a conceptual definition of
exploitation with a normative argument as to when it is justified collapses under its own weight, so here the inquiry into voluntariness
ultimately determines the question of enforceability. A surrogacy contract is enforceable, Wertheimer says, only if it is freely entered into.
Yet his inquiry into consent is extremely conceptualist, with definition
piled upon definition. Treating the presence or absence of coercion as a
question susceptible of logical determination, he ignores the moral/political choices involved in the selection of a definition. And since,
under Wertheimer's schema, how coercion is defined determines how
the surrogacy contract is to be treated, this flawed conceptual analysis
becomes the central determinant of the outcome; the normative element
is rendered irrelevant. 4
In separating out his conceptual analysis from a subsequent normative inquiry, Wertheimer not only fails to see that the conceptual analysis will affect what follows, but also erroneously assumes that by saving the normative dimension for later he can assure the viability of the
conceptual part. But Wertheimer's focus here on whether one of the
parties to the contract has affirmatively acted to harm the other party,
and his treatment of the background conditions as irrelevant, is itself a
value choice-a substantive preference for an individualist, rights-based
inquiry over, for example, a more community-focused perspective that
emphasizes, say, fiduciary duties and security instead of self-protection
and autonomy.49 While it may be that this is what Wertheimer means

46. Id. at 1223.
47. Id. at 1222.
48. Compare, for example, Albert Alschuler's take on coercion: "Most lawyers have known
for a long time that the term coercion cannot be defined, that judges place this label on results for
many diverse reasons, and that the word coercion metamorphoses remarkably with the factual
circumstances in which legal actors press it into service." Albert Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 957, 957 (1997). While some of Wertheimer's language suggests
that he adopts a similar view, the details of his analysis suggest otherwise. For him, the conceptual
inquiry into definition determines the supposedly normative conclusion about application.
49. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer of Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988).
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by the normative element in his analysis, that seems unlikely, for he
neither articulates the basis of that value choice nor defends it in any
way. Rather, it seems more likely that he simply fails to see the substantive political content residing within what he perceives to be the
initial, purely conceptual, side of his analysis.
Like the legal scholars who treat conceptual and anticonceptual
approaches as equally viable alternatives, Wertheimer here retains a
faith in conceptualism that reveals a failure to comprehend the corrosiveness of the critique that has been directed against it. Thus, rather
than fully abandon conceptualism, he tries to redeem it by combining it
with a separate "normative" analysis. But this pluralist approach domesticates the anticonceptualist critique and, as a result, fails to escape
reliance upon a set of formalist abstractions.
B. Decommodification and Positive Freedom
In addition to mislabeling his analysis as anticonceptualist,
Wertheimer also relies upon many of the substantive assumptions for
which conceptual thinkers, at least in law, have been repeatedly criticized. In particular, his narrow conceptualization of the autonomy interests at stake and his implicit reliance upon the public/private dichotomy
are both analytical moves that have characterized formalist legal
thought since the mid-19th century. Yet Wertheimer's rejection of conceptualism apparently does not extend to these elements. Like many
legal theorists who thought the realists' main contribution was to reveal
that legal thinking was divorced from modem social realities,
Wertheimer seems to be centrally concerned with the need to tie analyses of issues like surrogacy to concrete, empirical information. But, just
as many legal theorists who focused on empiricism failed to appreciate
the indeterminacy arguments of the critical realists, so here Wertheimer
has taken only a small piece of the modem critique of formalism into
his analysis, leaving much just as it was before. By thus domesticating
the progressive critique, he opens himself up to repeating many of the
flaws of conceptual analysis.
Wertheimer sees surrogacy as presenting a choice-of-two-evils type
of situation. If the woman would be worse off without being a surrogate, then we should not presume to prevent her from choosing that
option, even if surrogacy causes her some harm. "If a woman can reasonably regard surrogacy as improving her overall welfare given that
society has unjustly limited her options, it is arguable that it would be
adding insult to injury to deny her that opportunity."' By assuming

50.

Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1223.
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that governmental interference with such private choice is illegitimate,
Wertheimer ignores the fact that a number of practices are considered
sufficiently harmful to justify prohibition precisely to prevent individual actors from choosing them. Thus, the pressing question about surrogacy is, in a sense, whether a surrogate can reasonably regard the contract as beneficial to her--or whether we want, instead, to say as a
matter of law that it is not. While it is certainly possible to argue that
surrogacy is sufficiently harmful to justify prohibition,5' Wertheimer's
argument precludes that discussion by focusing on the question of government intervention and narrowly defining the harm of surrogacy.
Wertheimer fails to consider, for example, the wide variety of
choice-of-evil situations in which we prohibit a choice that would
arguably benefit someone because we decide that the harm that it
would do, both to that individual and to society at large, is of a type
that we simply do not wish to incur. That harm might come, in fact,
precisely from one's being required to make the decision to engage in
dehumanizing behavior that no rational person in one's position would
resist. As Wertheimer himself acknowledges, in limiting his conception
of harm to the surrogate to negative liberty, he precludes the conclusion that her positive liberty will actually be served by banning or regulating such contracts.
Yet the law has clearly recognized that decommodification-restraints on people's economic choices (on what can be exchanged in the market)-is sometimes necessary to truly protect
people's freedom. And an entire set of legal rules is premised upon the
assumption that "[t]here are ... some things that money cannot
' We do not allow people
buy."52
to enter into contracts of slavery, to
sell their organs, to agree to work in substandard industrial workplaces
or for less than the minimum wage, to live in housing that fails to meet
the housing code, etc. At least in some circumstances, we have answered the question Wertheimer poses, as to whether autonomy necessarily includes "the right to choose not to be positively or truly
' with a resounding "No." Sometimes,
free,"53
as John Stuart Mill so
aptly put it, such exercises of negative liberty "defeat[] . ..the very
purpose which is the justification of allowing" the exercise of freedom
to begin with.54 And Roscoe Pound, commenting on Mill's quote,
adds, "[This principle] applies to any situation where a person by contract imposes substantial restraints upon his liberty. Freedom to impose

51.

For an excellent articulation of that argument, see Radin, supra note 20, at 1921, 1928-

33.
52. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (NJ. 1988).
53. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1225 (cites omitted).
54. John Stuart Mill, Liberty, ch. V (discussing selling oneself into slavery) (cited in Roscoe
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454, 484 (1909)).
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these restraints, in the hands of the weak and necessitous, defeats the
very end of liberty."55
Now, obviously, there are many choices of evils that we allow
people to make. In fact, we usually do not worry at all about the coercive effect of market exchanges. Thus, we allow people to decide to
work in toxic workplaces, to labor a grueling number of hours each
week (with overtime pay or not, depending upon one's profession), to
work for companies that provide neither day care nor health insurance,
etc. The crucial question to address, therefore, is whether one can articulate a principled basis for decommodifying certain types of transactions but not others. Why should I be prevented from selling myself
into slavery but not from deciding to be a surrogate? What is it about
the harm of slavery that makes it categorically different from surrogacy? If we do not consider the harm of commodifying human beings
through slavery to be remediable by payment of a sufficiently large
amount of money, should we consider the harm of commodifying
human reproductive capacities through surrogacy to be? Questions like
these have been thoughtfully addressed by a number of legal scholars,
most notably Margaret Radin. Wertheimer's analysis, in falling to
raise them at all, is unsatisfying and incomplete.57
In addition, in limiting his notion of autonomy to negative liberty,
Wertheimer implicitly assumes that illegitimate governmental action is
limited to affirmative interference in the surrogate's decisions, rather
than including as well the failure to assure that the circumstances in
which she makes such decisions are adequate. In short, his position on
negative liberty relates to his argument that unjust background conditions are irrelevant to the status of a surrogacy arrangement. My critique of that argument is the focus of the next section.
C. Bringing the Background to the Foreground
1. Background Conditions and the Social Good: Wertheimer on
Individual and Society
a. Background Conditions and Nonrefusable Offers
At several points in his article, Wertheimer asserts that the social or
economic conditions under which a woman decides to be a surrogate

55. Pound, supra note 54, at 484.
56. See Radin, supra note 20, at 1928-33.
57. My point here is not that Wertheimer needed to engage in a lengthy discussion of such
questions in this symposium, for I realize that he was using surrogacy primarily as a vehicle for
exploring his concept of exploitation. The problem is rather that his approach-including his

cramped definition of harm---allows one to analyze the question of surrogacy without ever having
to acknowledge the importance of these questions.
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are irrelevant to his analysis. First, in considering nonrefusable offers,
he argues that the fact that background conditions may have caused the
woman to accept an offer she otherwise would have refused does not
render her decision involuntary.-" Wertheimer acknowledges the
critical challenge to conceptualist notions of choice, commenting that,
"[i]t may be argued that when background conditions provide an inadequate range of oppoMities, the moral quality or significance of one's
choice is diminished."59 But he adds that this can be so "even if the
background conditions do not compromise the 'voluntariness' of the
choice, strictly speaking. ' " Moreover, he proceeds to dismiss the
voluntariness concern in the surrogacy context, asserting that, regardless of any unjust background conditions, the contractual father's offer
is still a "positive good" because it allows the surrogate to improve her
welfare over the situation in which society has placed her.6 Thus, he
contends, a woman who finds herself in difficult background conditions
should not be prohibited from making the rational decision to sign a
surrogacy contract. "[I]t would be adding insult to injury," he asserts,
"to deny her that opportunity."
b. Societal Attitudes and Commodification
Similarly, Wertheimer is not willing to use societal reactions to
surrogacy as a reason for prohibiting it. In discussing whether the
commodification of surrogates' reproductive capacities harms them,63
he suggests that, because surrogacy might be regarded by some as "immoral" (on the grounds that "it is wrong to commodify procreational
labor""), a woman who engages in this practice might be "degraded"
in her own eyes or those of others.' Because such loss of respect comes from "the way surrogacy is regarded by the society," however,
"it is not clear that it represents a basis for condemning the practice

58. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1222.
59. Id. at 1223.
60. Id.
61. Wertheimer also emphasizes that whether we label the surrogate's consent coerced is
irrelevant anyway, since the coercion question cannot be resolved without substantive moral analysis. As discussed above, however, he never offers that analysis, and the question of coercion turns
out to be crucial to his ultimate conclusions, for he clearly asserts that nonconsensual surrogacy
contracts should probably not be enforced. Id. at 1221.
62. Id. at 1223.
63. Wertheimer does subsequently discuss whether surrogacy harms women as a group,
concluding that it does not. See infra, text accompanying note 71.
64. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1219.
65. Id. For a critique of Wertheimer's rather limited definition of commodification, see supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
66. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1219. For a discussion of other,
arguably more plausible, societal attitudes that could affect surrogates, see infra, text accompanying notes 73-81.
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rather than a basis for condemning society's reaction." Attitudinal, as
well as economic, background conditions are simply irrelevant to the
legitimacy of surrogacy contracts.
c. Social Good and the Individual
For Wertheimer, societal attitudes are not only an insufficient reason for concluding that surrogacy unacceptably commodifies women,
but are also an inadequate basis upon which to conclude that surrogacy
is unjust. He contends that, because its unjust effects on women as a
group or on society at large are counterbalanced by the positive effects
for the individual surrogate, contract parenthood ought not to be prohibited.
Wertheimer describes three possible bases for concluding that contract parenthood arrangements are unjust: because they "instantiate
unjust distributions," because they "instantiate[] highly asymmetrical
and unjust personal relations," and because they have "harmful effects
on women as a class. ' "e As to the first, he concludes that concern
about the distributive effects of such contracts does not justify state
intervention in the individual's decision to enter into one. The question,
he says, is "whether society can justifiably prevent [the surrogate] from
participating in such a transaction on the grounds that it is unjust. And
it is not clear that it can.' 9
In addressing the second type of justice concern, asymmetrical
and unjust personal relations, Wertheimer again focuses on whether the
government can override the choices of the individual: "[I]t is hard to
see why such transactions should be prohibited on the grounds that the
relation is unjust-at least if the welfare of the potential surrogate is
the focus of our concern."" As to the third concern, the effect on
women as a group--arguably the most relevant to issues of the relationship between the individual and the society-Wertheimer objects,
as noted above,7' that prohibiting surrogacy would burden a small
group of women (those who would like to be surrogates) at the expense
of a larger group of women (presumably women in general). Appar-

67. Wertheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1219.
68. Id. at 1227.
69. Id.
70. Id. It might be objected here that, because Wertheimer is using the surrogacy issue as a
vehicle for exploring and developing his concept of exploitation, his focus on the individual is
appropriate--and does not necessarily indicate an unwillingness to consider other non-individualist
bases for prohibiting surrogacy. However, to the extent that he addresses the ultimate prohibition
question, and includes in his analysis questions such as the impact of surrogacy on women as a
group, he clearly means to go beyond the development of his exploitation thesis. And, to the
extent that he treats
the exploitation question as determinative, which he seems to do at points, see
supra, text accompanying notes 38-42, he leaves himself open to the criticism leveled here.
71. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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ently, Wertheimer grounds this argument on the assumption that the
impact of any such group-wide harm on surrogates themselves is outweighed by the benefits to them (otherwise they wouldn't be burdened
by the prohibition at all.) He never explicitly states the basis of this
conclusion, however. Perhaps he believes that his discussion of "disrespect" of the surrogate adequately resolves the question, but, since that
discussion fails to consider the broad range of possible dehumanizing
effects that commodification could have on women (beyond loss of respect), it is unconvincing.'
It is interesting to note the rhetorical impact of Wertheimer's
concern for surrogates' interests. By suggesting that those interests
ought not to be sacrificed for the benefit of a larger group, he invokes
an image of the need to protect minorities-a concern for the little guy.
But the irony, of course, is that the commodification concern that many
writers have articulated relates directly to the status of women who are
likely to choose to be surrogates. That is, it is precisely the women
who have limited economic resources and hence might choose earning
money through surrogacy whose reproductive capacities are most susceptible to being seen as a means to individual or societal ends. Moreover, by conceptualizing the problem in this way, Wertheimer portrays
the issue as representing a sort of battle of the interest groups-pitting
the self-interest of potential surrogates against the self-interest of women unlikely to be surrogates. In so doing, he ignores the general societal interest in assuring that people are not treated in dehumanizing
ways and that harmful gender roles are not reinforced. Rather than
thinking about the common good in more organic terms, he reduces it
to the preferences of discrete groups.
Wertheimer's analyses of nonrefusable offers, commodification,
and what he calls "justice concerns" reveal a classic liberal individualist approach to the surrogacy issue-an approach which frames the
question as concerning the relationship between the state and the individual and assumes that legal rules regulating the contracts do not and
should not implicate broader societal concerns. For Wertheimer, it is
illegitimate for legal rules to burden individuals in order to improve the
community at large. He assumes a radical disjunction between the individual, the state, and the society: individual choices and societal attitudes neither are nor should be affected by law; the role Of the state is
to facilitate private freedom, not to change the conditions under which
that freedom is exercised, and the common good is determined by political struggle among interest groups. As the next subsection will argue, in rejecting conceptualism, Wertheimer has not moved the ball

72.

See Radin, supra note 20.

1997]

CONCEPTUALISM BY ANY OTHER NAME...

1301

very far beyond 19th century formalist analysis. He ignores the more
corrosive aspects of the critical challenge to conceptualism.
2. Choices, Background Conditions, and the Essentialized Legal Subject:
Wertheimer Criticized
Ignoring the extent to which surrogates' decisions are socially
constructed, as well as the role of law in that process, Wertheimer
precludes the recognition of society's, and the legal system's, responsibility for any harm that such arrangements might cause surrogates, as
well as any meaningful discussion of the broader societal impact of the
practice. In conceptualizing economic conditions, societal attitudes, and
individual women's choices as part of a private world in which law
does not and should not interfere, he employs essentially the same
conception of the relationship between society and the individual as is
employed by many mainstream legal thinkers, the public/private dichotomy. Like them, he rejects conceptualism while retaining the central
organizing structures that characterize much of formalist thinking in
law.
Wertheimer asserts that the intended parents who sign a surrogacy
contract have no obligation to repair the unjust background conditions
that induce the surrogate to agree to its terms. But this argument fails
to recognize that the invalidation of such contracts would not constitute
an illegitimate governmental intervention in the relationship between
two private actors. The legal system is implicated in the existence of
those background conditions; they are often, themselves, the product of
law. Thus, invalidation of the contracts is merely a change in the already existing regulatory system, not a turn to regulation where there
has previously been none.
Consider, for example, the surrogate's choice to bear a child for an
infertile couple, which many such women make because they want to
"give the gift of life" to others. 3 (Wertheimer appears to allude to
such altruistic impulses when he mentions the "psychological gratification"74 that surrogates get from the practice.) Why do such women
find giving this type of gift gratifying? If it makes them feel like good
people, why does it? To the extent that these women are also motivated
to use surrogacy as a way to earn money, why does the "job" of bearing children appeal to them? It doesn't take an expert on gender relations to notice that both altruism and motherhood (not to mention selfless motherhood) are central components of the idealized image of
womanhood that has been imposed upon women in this society for

73.
74.

See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d, at 1236.
Wetheimer, Commercial Surrogacy, supra note 8, at 1217.
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generations. 5
But my point here is not merely that societal attitudes contribute to

surrogates' choices.76 What is important for my argument is rather the
role that law has played in constructing those societal attitudes. Legal
culture, by treating the ideal woman as a creature of the domestic
sphere of children and home and not the public sphere of politics and
work, has helped to create and reinforce the societal attitudes that likely contribute to women's decisions to become surrogates. Legal rules
such as those that prohibited or discouraged women from being trustees
of estates' or serving as jurors 7 or continuing to work when pregnant79 prevented both privileged and outsider women s° from entering
or staying in the public sphere and, by establishing a domestic ideal of
womanhood, stigmatized those women who continued, whether by
choice or by necessity, to work outside the home. Thus, law is implicated in the societal attitudes that may make the altruistic aspects of
surrogacy appealing to some women. Similarly, judicial rulings that
justify the legal regulation of women's reproductive functions on the
grounds that it furthers the societal interest in producing babies"' legitimate instrumental uses of women's bodies and may thereby make it
easier for women themselves to see their reproductive capacities as vehicles for the realization of others' objectives.
Moreover, even if the main appeal of surrogacy is economic, rather

75. While not all women have been stereotyped in accordance with this image---privileged
women have been seen as vulnerable, altruistic, etc, while low income women and women of
color have not---all of them have been subjected to it, in the sense that it has been held up as an
ideal against which all are measured.
76. Nor do I mean to suggest that surrogates' decisions are determined by social forces.
Clearly, individuals themselves make their own choices within the decisional universe constructed
by the surrounding society. And clearly, the relationship between agency and environment is an
extraordinarily complex one. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency & Coercion
in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). (A statement by Karl Marx best captures, to my mind, the complexity (and truth, if you will) of the relation: A wage worker, he says,
is a "man who is compelled to sell himself of his own free will." KARL MARX, CAPITAL VOL.1
766 (1967) (quoted in Jeffrey Reiman, The Marxian Critique of Criminal Justice, in RADICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 119 (David S.Caudill & Steven Jay Gold, eds., 1995)). My only point here
is that Wertheimer fails to recognize this fact, and as a result, produces a cramped and ultimately
unelucidating discussion of the surrogacy issue.
77. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (overturning statute that gave preference to
men over women to serve as trustees of estates).
78. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (upholding statute that excluded women
from jury duty).
79. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal TreatmentlSpecial
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 352 (1984-85).
80. 1 use the term "privileged women" to refer to upper- and middle-income white women,
and "outsider women" to refer to low income white women and women of color of all socioeconomic classes. See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DuKE LJ. 492, 495
(1993) (developing these terms more fully).
81. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873-77 (1992) (holding that the
right to reproductive autonomy is not violated by state policies explicitly aimed at encouraging
women to have children).
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than attitudinal, law still affects women's choices to enter such contracts. As has been frequently pointed out, wealth distribution is greatly
affected by governmental policies, both directly (through tax laws, for
example) and indirectly (through property law, family law, criminal
law, comparable worth law, workplace regulation, and the like).82 The
unjust background conditions that Wertheimer sees as irrelevant to the
legitimacy of the surrogacy arrangement are themselves the product of
legal regulation of society. Even the infertile couple's infertility, as
well as their felt need to surmount it through surrogacy, are not disconnected from legal rules and policies. 3
Thus, to ban surrogacy would not necessarily be to make the
intended contractual parents repair the surrogate's unjust background
conditions, as Wertheimer suggests. Such a ban would not necessarily
constitute governmental imposition on the infertile couple of an obligation to protect surrogates from harmful choices. To see it that way is to
assume that both contracting parties exist in a self-created, extra-legal
condition, and that the surrogacy ban inserts governmental action to
change that otherwise purely private condition. Yet, in recent years,
critical legal scholars have thoroughly dismantled this vision of the
relationship between private freedom and public power84 (not to mention the earlier challenges by the realists85). As Frances Olsen has
pointed out, "[Tihe terms 'intervention' and 'nonintervention' are largely meaningless... and as general principles, 'intervention' and
'nonintervention' are indeterminate ....As long as a state exists and
enforces any laws at all, it makes political choices. The state cannot be
neutral or remain uninvolved, nor would anyone want the state to do
6
SO.''
i For this reason, a law that prohibited surrogacy need not necessarily be seen as the imposition of a governmental burden on those

82. In the surrogacy context, for example:
From a legally enforced regime of private property that makes most people's survival
depend on wage labor, to a publicly structured wage system that fails to give equal pay
to women for work of comparable worth to that performed by men, to a definition of
wage labor ...
that excludes domestic work in one's home, the law establishes a background that severely constrains women's economic power and choices.
Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance? The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the Surrogacy
and Abortion Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1369, 1386 n.62 (1992) (reviewing CARMEL A.
SHALEV, BtRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989)).
83. Causes of infertility that can be affected by legal policies include sexually transmitted
diseases, workplace hazards such as chemicals and radiation, and unconsented sterilization.
Moreover, law's role in elevating biological kinship reinforces the notion that infertility is a tragedy. See SHALEV, supra note 82, at 76-77; Ehrenreich, supra note 82, at 1386-87.
84. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
85. See, e.g., Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927); Robert
L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCl. Q.470
(1923).
86. Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
835, 835-36 (1985).
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citizens who desire to participate in the practice. Rather, it could just as
easily be seen as the removal of a previously-created governmental
subsidy in favor of those individuals-as elimination of the effects of
all the policies that gave the contracting parents the bargaining power
to obtain the surrogate's consent to begin with.
.
Thus, by retaining the liberal individualist notion of the
essentialized subject-a self-creating person separate from social context, who responds to culture rather than being constituted by
it-Wertheimer reproduces the same structural categories that usually
inform conceptualist analyses. In so doing, he fails to acknowledge the
alternative, constructivist, understanding of the relation between individual and society and hence fails to recognize his own take as challengeable. Like many conceptualists, he fails to see that his analysis is
grounded on an unarticulated, political choice. 8
Surrogacy is a very difficult issue. It is not clear to me that all
surrogacy contracts for pay should necessarily be prohibited, or that all
instrumental uses of women's bodies or reproductive capacities necessarily harm the women who engage in those practices. Like Professor
Wertheimer, I find it somewhat patronizing when academicians presume to know better than the individuals involved which side of a
choice of evils is the least harmful one to pick. But I also believe that
approaching the contract parenthood question from a perspective like
Wertheimer's is ultimately more harmful than helpful.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In surrogacy, as in many legal issues, the devil is in the details. A
process like that which led to Mary Beth Whitehead's pregnancy is
clearly untenable; one where the surrogate picks the couple she is to
work with, where both sides receive an independent mental health exam and the results of all such exams, where the surrogate has her own
independent attorney, where she is allowed to pick her physician,
where the fee is commensurate with the valuable and demanding service being provided, and where the costs of medical complications of
the pregnancy (including lost income) are bom by the contracting parents, might not be. Surrogacy might reinforce the damaging reduction
of women to their bodies or it might destabilize traditional notions of
motherhood as selfless and domestic, rather than lucrative and commer-

87. See id. at 852, 860.
88. I should emphasize here that I am not saying the constructivist account is more true or
correct. And in fact, it might be most helpful to conceive of the individual and society as in a
dialectical relationship with each other, so that neither essentialism nor constructivism provides the
full answer. My point here is simply that Wertheimer's analysis, like the conceptualism he attempts to escape, necessarily entails political choices.
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cial. Its effects will depend on its implementation and, in any event,
they are inevitably difficult to predict.
But, regardless of the ultimate conclusion one reaches about contract parenthood, it is clear that to pose the issue as a question of
whether certain abstract definitions of harm or consent are met, or
whether government can justly override the private choice of a woman
to become a surrogate, or whether it can require the contractual parents
to act altruistically towards her, is to obscure the very real moral/political decisions that must be made. It is to substitute abstract,
individualist analytics for an admittedly more ambitious (and muddy)
inquiry into what kind of kinship system, gender relations, relationship
to our physical bodies, and reproductive roles we want to have in this
society."
Moreover, an argument that retains these structural elements of
liberal thinking, even while explicitly rejecting purely abstract and
deductive analysis, fundamentally misperceives the danger of formalist
approaches to sociolegal issues. It reduces the critical argument to
nothing more than a set of alternative methodological preferences (the
specific over the general, the concrete over the abstract, the empirical
over the metaphysical, etc.) and ignores the more fundamental substantive assumptions that motivate modern critiques. Dangerously domesticating critical thought, it pretends that pluralist combination of contradictory views is possible and that politics can be tamed by law.

89. For a treatment of the surrogacy issue that relies upon the same public/private dichotomy
as does Wertheimer, but nevertheless manages to engage issues of gender role and kinship definition in a creative and thought-provoking way, see SHALEV, supra note 82. See also, Ehrenreich,
supra note 80 (reviewing Shalev's book).

